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B.

If the appellate court has erroneously assumed facts

when those facts have been specifically briefed by Appellee,
is the trial court precluded from taking evidence and basing
its decision on the actual facts?

The issue of whether the

trial court has discretion is a question of law to be reviewed
by this Court for correctness.2
C.

When attempting to find the value of the services of

a party to a contract should the court determine what value the
parties would have put on the services at the time they entered
into the contract given the facts and circumstances extant at
that time, or should it determine the value of the services by
taking evidence as to what was actually done by the party
seeking compensation?

This is a question of law to be reviewed

by this Court for correctness.3
AUTHORITY
The following cases, among others, may be determinative of
the issues stated:
Major v. Benton,
Searle

v.

Allstate

647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir 1981);
Life

Ins.

1985).

2

Id.

3

Id.
2

Co.,

696 P.2d 1308 (Cal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by the limited
partners (Appellees herein) of a Utah Limited Partnership known
as D.S.T. Limited against the General Partner

(Dixie Six

Corporation) to determine the appropriate division of the
partnership profits.
Proceedings Below
Pertinent proceedings below include:
A. On September 23, 1983, Plaintiffs/Appellees Vivian M.
Scheller and Steven D. Tollstrup ("Scheller and Tollstrup")
filed suit in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County

seeking

a declaratory

judgment

against Defendant/

Appellant Dixie Six Corporation ("Dixie Six").4
B.

On May 10, 1985, following trial without jury, the

Honorable Dean E. Conder ruled that under the terms of the
written contract between the parties, the profits, after
payment

of expenses

to both parties

and a real

estate

commission to Dixie Six Corporation, should be divided equally
between the parties; judgment was entered accordingly on June
18, 1985.5
4

R. at 2-14.

5

R. at 129-131.
3

C.

Scheller

and

Tollstrup

appealed

Judge

Conder's

decision; the Court of Appeals, under case number 20850,
affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that the contract
of the parties did not provide for a split in the profits in
the event improvements on the property were not constructed and
directing that the trial court determine, on the basis of
quantum

meruit,

the value of the services of the general

partner, Dixie Six Corporation. The Court of Appeals' decision
is reported at 753 P.2d 971 (1988).6
D.

Defendant, believing that the Court of Appeals failed

to consider a provision in the parties' contract

(Article

XVIII) requiring a 50/50 split of profits in the event of
dissolution, petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of
Certiorari on May 25, 1988.
E.

The petition was denied.

On remand, the matter was tried before the Honorable

Leonard H. Russon in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt
Lake County, on November 21, 1989. The trial judge ruled that
he was precluded from hearing evidence of the content of the
agreement of the parties because of the statement of the Court
of Appeals in its decision that no such term existed in the
agreement.

The trial judge concluded that the "law of the

6

R. at 332-336 and 344-349.
4

case" doctrine prevented him from making a finding different
from that of the Court of Appeals.7
F.

The trial court ruled that the sole issue before it

was the valuation of the efforts of the general partner.

It

further ruled that the value should not be determined by
looking at what the parties would have agreed to when the
partnership agreement was entered into, but rather by looking
at the hours worked and services actually performed, as nearly
as they could be reconstructed.8
G.

On April 17, 1990, Judge Russon entered his Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.9

This appeal is

taken from the judgment dated April 17, 1990.
H.

Both Scheller and Tollstrup and Dixie Six filed

Motions for Summary Disposition with the Utah Supreme Court,
which were denied.
STATEMENT OP THE FACTS
1. In March of 1979, Scheller and Tollstrup and Dixie Six
entered into a limited partnership agreement for the purpose of
developing a certain piece of real property owned by Scheller

7

R. at 399, 401, 409.

8

R. at 401-403.

9

F i n d i n g s of Fact and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law (R. 408-410) and
Judgment (R. a t 416-417) d a t e d A p r i l 17, 1990.
5

and

Tollstrup

in

Salt

Lake

County,

Utah.

The

limited

partnership was named D.S.T. Ltd. ("D.S.T.") .10
2.

Dixie Six contributed $10,000 toward the initial

capital for the limited partnership, and Scheller and Tollstrup
conveyed the property to D.S.T.11
3.

Dixie Six spent considerable time, effort, and money

developing the property, but D.S.T. was unable to obtain
financing for the project.12
4.

In early 1983, Scheller agreed to a sale of the

property by D.S.T. to an entity known as P.F. West.

For

irrelevant reasons, the sale was never completed.13
5. Eventually, the property was sold to Busch Development
Company ("Busch") on essentially the same terms as the proposed
sale to P.F. West.

Scheller and Tollstrup received a total of

$915,032.03 from the sale of the property.14

10

R. at 12, 383-384.

n

R. at 385.

12

R. at 386-388.

13

R. at 388-389.

14

R. at 124-125.
6

6.

A dispute arose among the parties concerning whether

Dixie Six was entitled to share in the profits generated from
the sale.15
7.

On September 23, 1983, Scheller and Tollstrup filed

suit in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
seeking a declaratory judgment limiting Dixie Six to the
recovery of its expenses plus the 6% sales commission for the
sale of the property to Busch, and prohibiting Dixie Six from
sharing in the profit from the sale as set forth in the limited
partnership agreement.16
8.

On May 10, 1985, following trial without jury, the

Honorable Dean E. Conder ruled that Dixie Six did not breach
the limited partnership agreement and that Dixie Six had
developed and marketed the property in accordance with the
terms of the limited partnership agreement.17
9. The trial court found that Scheller and Tollstrup were
estopped from claiming that Dixie Six was not entitled to a
full share of its profits in accordance with the terms of the
limited partnership agreement.18
15

R. at 2-3.

16

R. at 2-4.

17

R. at 125.

18

R. at 126.
7

10.

Finally, the trial court concluded that Scheller and

Tollstrup waived the claims set forth in their Complaint.

On

June 18, 1985, judgment was entered in favor of Dixie Six.19
11.
decision.

Scheller & Tollstrup then appealed Judge Conder's
In Judge Orme's written opinion, the Court of

Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part as follows:
1. It determined that, contrary to the
trial court's finding, Scheller and
Tollstrup were not estopped by their
conduct in not objecting to the two prior
sales and in only objecting to the
distribution of the proceeds from the sale
to Busch after the sale had taken place.
2.
It found that the trial court's
definition of the term "develop" was
incorrect in that Dixie Six was under an
obligation to "build" something on the
property.
3. Finally, the Court of Appeals found
that, in the event of a breach, no
contractual provision existed as to the
allocation of the proceeds if the property
was sold undeveloped and, therefore, Dixie
Six is only entitled to recover under a
quantum meruit theory of compensation.
Scheller

v. Dixie

12.

Six,

753 P.2d 971 (Utah App. 1988) .20

On or about May 25, 1988, Dixie Six petitioned the

Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. The petition was
denied.
19

R. at 129-130.

20

R. at 344-349.
8

13.

On remand the matter was tried before the Honorable

Leonard H. Russon, Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, on November 21, 1989.

Judge Russon concluded that he

was bound by the "law of the case" doctrine to accept the Court
of Appeals' finding that the parties' limited partnership
agreement contained no provision addressing the allocation of
the sales proceeds in the event of a breach by Dixie Six.

On

April 17, 1990, Judge Russon entered Judgment awarding Dixie
Six the sum of $36,000 as the value of its efforts to develop
the property.21

This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court committed error when it refused to hear
evidence which would have disclosed that the Court of Appeals
was mistaken when it concluded that the parties' agreement
contained no provision as to the allocation of the proceeds
under

the

erroneously

circumstances

of

the

case.

The

trial

court

concluded that the law of the case doctrine

prevented it from reexamining the parties' agreement. The law
of the case doctrine is not an inflexible prohibition against
departure from legal parameters earlier announced in a case.
Furthermore, the doctrine only applies to legal conclusions.
By refusing to take evidence which would have revealed the
21

R. at 416-417.
9

Court of Appeals's erroneous factual conclusion, the trial
court committed error.
The trial court also erred in its determination of the
reasonable value of Dixie Six's services.

As mandated by the

Court of Appeals, the trial court sought to determine the
amount of additional

compensation to which Dixie Six is

entitled under a theory of quantum

meruit.

Rather than

determining the reasonable value of Plaintiff's services based
on the facts and circumstances existing at the time, and the
risks allocated to each party under the agreement, the trial
court attempted to reconstruct the actual hours expended by
Dixie Six in rendering the services.

In doing so, the trial

court committed error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY REFUSING TO

CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES1 AGREEMENT.
The first question presented is whether the trial court's
rigid adherence to the "law of the case" was manifest error.
Both before and at the trial before Judge Russon, Dixie Six
pointed out that the Court of Appeals was mistaken when it
concluded that the parties' agreement contained no provision
"as to the allocation of proceeds in the event that Dixie Six
10

failed to develop the property as required by the agreement."
Scheller

v.

Dixie

Six

Corp.,

1988) J1

The trial court refused to hear or consider evidence

753 P.2d 971, 975

(Utah App.

of the parties' agreement, limiting the inquiry to "the sole
question

[of]

compensation

in

whether
quantum

Dixie

Six

was

meruit . . . .H23

entitled
The

to

any

following

dialogue illustrates the trial court's position:
MR. ADAMSON: The additional item that we
did speak of in chambers, and I want to
make a clear record on and we discussed
was the fact that in its decision the
Court of Appeals says that there is no
contract provision which provides for what
is to be done on the dissolution of the
partnership. And it is our position that
the Court of Appeals has misread the
contract and failed to take note of those
provisions in our brief which point out
what the contract said.
THE COURT: Well, that issue is not before
this court.
MR. ADAMSON:
I understand that, Your
Honor. I just want to make a clear record
on it and point out and request the Court
^Dixie Six's position concerning allocation of the
proceeds upon sale of the property in an undeveloped state was
argued to and accepted by the first trial court (See Judge
Conder's Findings and Conclusions dated 6/18/85 attached to
Brief of Appellants in Case No. 20850), argued to the Court of
Appeals (See Brief of Respondent, Case No. 20850 at pp. 22-27),
and argued to the Supreme Court in Dixie Six's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari (Petition, Case No. 860147-CA at Point I).
^Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Civil No.
830906862CV, dated April 17, 1990 (R. at 408-410).
11

to make a finding that the provision of
118 does exist in the contract and a
Conclusion of Law that because of the fact
the Court of Appeals has said that it is
not, that it is not before the Court.

THE COURT:
And now that the Court of
Appeals has ruled, I am not going to open
back up any of the provisions of the
contract because they have ruled that
there may be recovery under quantum meruit
in this particular case and they gave the
reasons why and it was reversed only to
that single issue. And the only evidence
I will receive will be evidence that goes
to that single issue.
Trial Tr. (11/21/89) at 3-5.
The "law of the case" doctrine is not an inflexible
prohibition against departure from a rule of law earlier
announced in a case.24

Rather, it is a rule "of expedition,

designed to bring about a quick resolution of disputes by
preventing continued reargument of issues already decided."
Major

v.

Benton,

647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981).

The

doctrine may be disregarded when necessary to avoid an "unjust
decision."

Searle

v.

Allstate

Life

Ins.

Co.,

696 P.2d 1308,

1314 (Cal. 1985).

24

Searle

See Major v. Benton,
v. Allstate
Life Ins.

647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1981);
Co., 676 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 1985).
12

Moreover, the doctrine only applies to legal conclusions,
as its name implies.25

The Court of Appeals1 s conclusion

concerning the content of the parties1 agreement was a factual
conclusion.

As such, it was not subject to the "law of the

case" doctrine.
Finally, the conclusion is wrong.

The Court of Appeals

held that the conduct of the parties established a contract
implied in fact, entitling Dixie Six to a recovery in quantum
meruit.26

The Court of Appeals premised its holding on its

finding that " . . . there was simply no agreement between the
parties as to the allocation of proceeds in the event that
Dixie Six failed to develop the property as required by the
agreement."

Scheller

v.

Dixie

Six

Corp.,

753 P.2d 971, 975

(Utah App. 1988).
This finding ignored Articles XVIII and IX of the parties'
agreement.

If Dixie Six failed to perform its obligations,

Scheller1s and Tollstrup's remedy is contained in Article XVIII
of the Limited Partnership Agreement, entitled "Dissolution of
Partnership," which reads as follows:

^Searle,
26

Scheller
1988) .

696 P.2d at 1314.
v. Dixie

Six Corp.,
13

753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App.

The partnership shall be dissolved upon
the occurrence of any of the following
events:
(a) the sale of all property to third
parties.
(b)
the bankruptcy, insolvency,
receivership or involuntary dissolution
of Dixie.
(c) upon written notice by the limited
partners, if Dixie shall fail to
perform its obligations hereunder and
such failure shall continue for a
period of thirty (30) days after
receipt of such written notice.
In the event of a dissolution as provided
hereinabove,
the
partnership
shall
immediately begin to wind up its affairs.
The
proceeds
from
liquidation
of
partnership assets, after payment to all
creditors of the partnership in the order
of priority provided by law, shall be paid
and applied in accordance with Article IX
hereinabove.
In the

event that Dixie Six failed

to

satisfy its

obligation to develop the property, the remedy is to have
D.S.T.

liquidated

distributed

and

the proceeds

from

the

liquidation

in accordance with Article IX of the limited

partnership agreement.

Article IX, 59.2, states:

9.2 Receipts of the partnership shall be
allocated as follows:
(a) First, to the actual expenses of
the partnership or Dixie relative to
the
subdividing,
development,
improvement and sale of the property,
such expenses to be itemized on a
14

monthly statement
limited partners.

provided

to

the

(b) Second, to payment to the limited
partners for the real property.
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder
to Dixie and one-half of the remainder
to the limited partners.
The Court of Appeals was wrong in its conclusion that the
parties' agreement contained no provision for the allocation of
the

proceeds

on

contemplated.

failure

of

Dixie

Six

to

perform

as

On remand, Dixie Six made it clear that the

Court of Appeals overlooked the contract provision.
California Supreme Court noted in Searle

v.

Allstate,

As the
under

these circumstances the law of the case doctrine has no
application:
The primary purpose served by the law-ofthe-case rule is one of judicial economy.
Finality is attributed to an initial
appellate ruling so as to avoid the
further reversal and proceedings on remand
that would result if the initial ruling
were not adhered to in a later appellate
proceeding.
(Citations omitted)
That
reason for the rule is inoperative when
the court hearing the subsequent appeal
determines that there should be a reversal
on a ground that was not considered on the
prior appeal.
Searle

v. Allstate
Evidence

Life

Ins.

concerning

Co.,
the

696 P.2d at 1314.
provision

in

the

parties'

agreement relating to allocation of the proceeds was not
15

considered by the Court of Appeals.

Judge Russon committed

manifest error when he concluded that he was prohibited by the
law of the case doctrine from hearing evidence of the parties'
agreement, evidence not considered by the Court of Appeals.

POINT II:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OP THE

REASONABLE VALUE OF DIXIE SIX'S SERVICES.
As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Scheller
Six

Corp.,

meruit

v.

Dixie

753 P.2d 971 (Utah App. 1988), recovery in quantum

". . .is for the amount the parties can be said to have

reasonably intended as the contract price."

Id.

at 975. The

best evidence of what the parties "reasonably intended as the
contract price" is the contract itself.

As noted above, the

parties specifically addressed "the contract price," but the
trial court felt bound by the law of the case doctrine to focus
on evidence other than the parties' agreement.
The direction given on remand was simply to determine "the
amount of additional compensation to which Dixie
entitled under a theory of quantum

meruit."

Id.

Six is
at 976.

Assuming no contract provision, as the Court of Appeals did,
the direction was to "infer the amount [the parties intended]
to be the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services."
at 975.
16

Id.

Given this direction, the trial court was faced with
either

evaluating

the

issue

based

on

the

facts

and

circumstances existing at the time the parties entered into the
contract, including the risks allocated to each party by the
terms of the contract, or by determining the value of the
services based on what was actually done by the party seeking
compensation. In choosing the latter approach, the trial court
committed error.
The trial court attempted to reconstruct what actually
happened, which had the effect of ignoring the risks and duties
allocated by the agreement.

The situation is not unlike an

attorney-client contingent fee agreement. A hindsight analysis
of the reasonable value of the services provided by an attorney
under a contingent fee agreement can take into consideration
only the hours expended by the attorney. The obvious error in
analyzing the issue from this perspective, however, is that it
does not take into consideration the risks assumed by the
attorney in taking the case, including the risk of no recovery,
nor does it give any credence to the express intentions of the
parties.
Likewise, the trial court's attempt to value the services
provided by Dixie Six based on the amount of time expended by
Dixie Six ignores the facts and circumstances existing at the
17

time the agreement was made, ignores the express intent of the
agreement itself, and ignores the allocation of risks between
the parties.

Like an attorney entering into a contingent fee

agreement, Dixie Six's compensation was dependent on a positive
result from its development efforts.

Dixie Six agreed to put

up $10,000 in initial capitalization plus over $70,000 in costs
for the chance to share in any profits eventually generated by
its efforts.
The only evidence before the trial court on the reasonable
value of the services provided by Dixie Six in light of these
facts and circumstances was given by Richard Moffit, a real
estate broker and developer with The Boyer Company.27

Mr.

Moffit testified that the reasonable value of the services
provided by Dixie Six, considering the risks, is 30% of the net
profits.28

The trial court chose to ignore Mr. Moffit's

testimony, instead basing its decision on a reconstruction of
the hours expended.

In doing so, the trial court committed

error.

^Mr. Moffit's testimony begins at p. 148 of the transcript
of trial (11/21/89).
28

Trial Tr. (11/22/89) at 15.
18

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the trial court's decision
should

be

reversed

and

the matter

remanded

for further

consideration of the parties' agreement and its bearing on the
issue of the amount of additional compensation due to Dixie
Six.

DATED: May J?__, 1991.
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^

Craig G. Adamson
Eric P. Lee
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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